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Copyright Misuse:
Protecting Copyright in Canada from Overreach and Abuse
Martin Twigg*
Introduction
Faced with a rapidly evolving technological landscape—one in
which near-perfect copies of digital content can be created and
disseminated with minimal cost and unprecedented ease—copyright
owners have sought to exercise greater control over expressive
works. In many cases, they have undertaken this task by harnessing
the very same technological forces that threaten to disrupt their
traditional business models:1 monitoring online activity and
responding to potentially infringing uses with thousands of ceaseand-desist letters; licensing rather than selling digital works; or
locking down content with technological access and control
measures. These attempts at enhanced protection merit concern
because their effectiveness is, for the most part, not limited by the
scope of rights granted to copyright owners under the Copyright Act.2
Unrestrained by copyright's statutory limits (including the restriction
against copyrighting works in the public domain) and internal safetyvalves (such as fair dealing), content holders are now able to
routinely overreach the boundaries of copyright law and abuse their
limited statutory grant of rights in copyrighted works. This
behaviour, which I refer to generally as “overreach and abuse,” can
be classified into two broad categories.3

*Martin Twigg is a J.D. student at Dalhousie University, Schulich School of Law.
He will be clerking at the Supreme Court of British Columbia before beginning his
articles at a large regional firm in Vancouver, B.C.
1

See Sara Wei-Ming Chan, “Canadian Copyright Reform: 'User Rights' in the
Digital Era” (2009) 67 UT Fac L Rev 235 (“[t]his phenomenon has allowed
unprecedented access to copyrighted materials, hence engendering new forms of
creativity and authorship. At the same time, these developments have provided
rights holders with the technological tools to monitor and control the use of their
works in ways previously unimagined” at 239).
2
RSC 1985, c C-42.
3
Any attempt at categorization is subject to a degree of arbitrariness and other
approaches are equally valid. For instance, Peter Yu and John Cross identify four
categories of abusive behaviour by copyright owners in U.S. and Canadian case
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The first category includes protective measures that, although
procedurally valid, cannot ultimately be substantiated in law.
Labelled by commentators as “copyfraud,”4 these actions involve
content holders increasingly laying claim to rights in expressive
works that have little or no basis in copyright law. Backed by threats
of litigation, these spurious claims often go uncontested due to the
power imbalance existing between owner and user groups. The
second category includes protective measures that are substantively
legal, but entirely divorced from the statutory domain of copyright
law. Contractual agreements—many of which are subject to
considerable inequality of bargaining power—and an array of
technological protection measures or “digital locks”—which can be
further supported by anti-circumvention laws—are being employed
with increasing frequency by content owners. The result is a
comprehensive system of legally enforceable barriers to expressive
works that often trump copyright law, the terms of which are set
almost entirely by private entities. Taken together, these two
categories of behaviour not only tip the balance in favour of content
holders, rendering users' rights such as fair dealing largely
ineffectual, but also threaten to marginalize the application and
therefore relevancy of copyright law as a whole. Increasingly,
copyright is being displaced by a comprehensive “privately defined
rights regime.”
In response to this trend, courts, copyright users and legal scholars
have begun to look outside the statutory confines of copyright law in
the hope of identifying legal tools capable of restoring a degree of
balance to the regulation and control of expressive works.5 One
avenue currently being pursued in the United States is the doctrine of
copyright misuse, an equitable defence to copyright infringement
that arises when a copyright owner has “misused” his or her
copyright. Where the Copyright Act is silent or unable to prevent
content holders from overstepping the bounds of copyright law, the
doctrine of copyright misuse provides owners with an incentive to
law. See John T Cross and Peter K Yu, “Competition Law and Copyright Misuse”
(2008) 56 Drake L Rev 427 at 434-438.
4
See Jason Mazzone, “Copyfraud” (2006) 81 NYU L Rev 1026 at 1028.
5
Among the legal measures being explored to counteract the abusive behaviour of
copyright owners are competition law, the doctrines of copyright misuse and
unclean hands, abuse of process and tortious interference. See Cross and Yu, supra
note 3 at 455-461.
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respect the statutory limits of copyright, lest they risk losing the
ability to enforce certain legal claims until the behaviour constituting
misuse has been remedied.
Although Canada is vulnerable to many of the same forces of
overreach and abuse as the United States, no doctrine comparable to
copyright misuse currently exists in Canadian law. This may simply
be due to the relatively short history of copyright misuse in
American jurisprudence, but is likely also attributable to a previous
lack of a clearly articulated justification for the doctrine’s existence
in Canada. However, the Supreme Court of Canada in a “trilogy” of
copyright cases has recently filled that purposive vacuum.6 The
notion of balance between dual objectives, the concept of users'
rights and an increasingly economic and instrumentalist
understanding of copyright law—all principles to emerge from the
trilogy—provide strong support for a “made-in-Canada” approach to
copyright misuse. Although unlikely to stem the tide of overreach
and abuse completely, the doctrine would serve to uphold the
statutory limits of copyright, helping to ensure the Copyright Act’s
continuing role as the dominant means of regulating expressive
works in Canada.
This paper is divided into four parts. Part I canvasses the growing
phenomenon of overreach and abuse by content holders. Two broad
categories of behaviour are explored, revealing the need for a judicial
doctrine capable of responding to the threats posed to copyright law
as a result. Part II examines the American doctrine of copyright
misuse as a tool to address instances of overreach and abuse. Its
recent emergence from the related doctrine of patent misuse is
discussed, along with its various doctrinal approaches and potential
for future growth and expansion. Part III justifies the importation of
the copyright misuse doctrine into Canadian law. The recent
articulation of copyright's purpose by the Supreme Court of Canada
is proposed as a justificatory basis for the doctrine's recognition, and
6

See Daniel Gervais, “The Purpose of Copyright Law in Canada” (2005) 2 UOLTJ
315 (“[i]n three recent cases, the Supreme Court of Canada provided Canadian
copyright law with something that had arguably been missing: a purpose” at 317);
Théberge v Galerie d'Art du Petit Champlain inc., 2002 SCC 34 [Théberge]; CCH
Canadian Ltd. v Law Society of Upper Canada, 2004 SCC 13 [CCH]; Society of
Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v Canadian Assn. of Internet
Providers, 2004 SCC 45 [SOCAN].
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concerns relating to the viability of copyright misuse in Canada are
also addressed. Part IV contains a brief conclusion.
Part I: Identifying Overreach and Abuse
a) “Copyfraud”: An intellectual property gold rush
The first category of overreach and abuse concerns systematic
attempts by content holders to assert rights in expressive works that
are of questionable legal merit. Although the Copyright Act provides
a variety of remedies to protect the rights of copyright owners, the
statute is conspicuously silent on how owners may go about
enforcing those rights.7 Since there is no mechanism within the Act to
prevent individuals from asserting frivolous claims, copyright
owners are incentivized to define their rights as broadly as possible,
even laying claim to works in the public domain or to expression not
eligible for copyright protection. This behaviour has been labelled by
some critics as “copyfraud”: an attempt to exercise monopoly rights
in an expressive work that has no basis in copyright law.8
False copyright claims commonly arise in the form of cease-anddesist letters. Threats of litigation can be used to stifle critical
speech, leverage greater control in the marketplace9 and extract rents
for unauthorized uses of a copyrighted work that are, in fact, fully
permitted under the Act.10 While such behaviour is by no means new
or even technically illegal, the increasingly aggressive protection of
copyrights, made possible in part by recent changes in technology,11

7

See Cross and Yu, supra note 3 (speaking in regards to both U.S. and Canadian
copyright law at 455).
8
See Mazzone, supra note 4 at 1028.
9
See Jennifer M Urban & Laura Quilter, “Efficient Process or 'Chilling Effects'?
Takedown Notices Under Section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act”
(2005-2006) Santa Clara Computer & High Tech LJ 621 at 687.
10
See Mazzone, supra note 4 at 1026.
11
Content holders regularly scour the Internet searching for potential infringing
uses, sometimes sending huge volumes of cease-and-desist letters in response. See
Victoria Smith Erkstrand, “Protecting the Public Policy Rationale of Copyright:
Reconsidering Copyright Misuse” (2006) Comm L & Pol'y 565 (Erkstrand
describes an “ever-growing population of 'copyright bullies'” who “send out
thousands of cease and desist letters” at 566). Legal action en masse is often
fraught with problems. See generally Urban and Quilter, supra note 9.
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has led to a “systematic over-claiming of copyright.”12 The
Electronic Frontier Foundation (a non-profit organization dedicated
to protecting civil liberties on the Internet), in conjunction with a
number of law schools, has been documenting these spurious claims
through the joint project “Chilling Effects.”13 In a study of nearly 900
cease-and-desist letters sent by copyright holders under notice and
takedown provisions of the United States Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (DMCA),14 roughly a third were found to be deficient
in some manner, mostly due to a questionable underlying copyright
claim.15
This overreaching behaviour is not limited to the online environment,
but rather affects old and new media alike. Books and other
publications regularly contain copyright notices warning against
unauthorized reproduction in any form,16 even when the majority or
all of its content exists in the public domain.17 Similar notices
accompany broadcasts of sporting events on television18 and even the
most casual of film viewers will be familiar with the FBI warnings
on VHS tapes and DVDs threatening severe civil and criminal
penalties for unauthorized copying.19 According to Judge Richard
Posner, these expansive warnings are nothing more than “pure
bluff,” laying claim to sweeping rights that cannot possibly be
justified on such absolute terms, particularly in light of fair use laws
in the United States (or, for that matter, fair dealing laws in

12

See Richard Posner, “Fair Use and Misuse” (24 August, 2004), online: Lawrence
Lessig's Blog <http://www.lessig.org/blog/archives/002119.shtml>.
13
See Chilling Effects <http://www.chillingeffects.org>.
14
Pub L No 105-304, Title I, 112 Stat 2860 (1998) (17 USC).
15
See Urban & Quilter, supra note 9 at 666.
16
See William F Patry & Richard A Posner, “Fair Use and Statutory Reform in the
Wake of Eldred” (2004) 92 Calif L Rev 1639 at 1655.
17
See Mazzone, supra note 4 at 1028.
18
The Computer & Communications Industry Association recently filed a
complaint against a number of sports, entertainment and publishing companies,
including the National Football League and Major League Baseball, before the
Federal Trade Commission alleging that such warnings were misrepresentative of
copyright law and constituted deceptive and unfair trade practices. For an excellent
account of the dispute, see Cory Tadlock, “Copyright Misuse, Fair Use, and
Abuse: How Sports and Media Company are Overreaching Their Copyright
Protections” (2008) J Marshall Rev Intell Prop L 621.
19
Ibid at 621.
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Canada).20 Yet the mere threat of litigation, no matter how weak the
underlying copyright claim, often yields highly effective results.21
In 2003, a controversial intellectual property dispute was initiated
over images of the Bluenose, the iconic Nova Scotian tall ship etched
on the Canadian dime. The Bluenose II Preservation Trust Society
(“the Society”), a group tasked with maintaining a reproduction of
the vessel, owned the copyright in the ship's architectural plans and
began to assert monopoly rights over any use of the ship's image.22
When a company manufacturing Bluenose souvenirs refused to pay a
licensing fee, the Society sued for trademark and copyright
infringement. Although the Society eventually dropped the lawsuit
after the provincial government intervened, Teresa Scassa analyzed
the validity of claims brought by the Society and found them to be
“largely without merit,”23 while the copyright claim in particular
verged on absurdity.24 Nonetheless, the Society had collected
licensing fees from a range of local businesses for years prior to the
lawsuit,25 illustrating the harmful and unjust effects of copyfraud. Far
from being an isolated case, Scassa believes the overreaching
behaviour of the Society is indicative of a larger trend:
In the information age, and in an increasingly "branded"
society, intellectual property has taken on a very
significant commercial value. As a result, some entities
20

Patry & Posner, supra note 16 at 1655-1656.
Due to the costs of litigation and the power imbalance often present between
owner and user groups, parties facing threats of legal action regularly choose the
path of least resistance and simply accede to the frivolous claims. Judge Posner
argues that the tendency of users to “underenforce their legitimate rights” is
attributable to an “asymmetry of stakes” between owners and users of copyright.
See Patry & Posner, supra note 16 at 1643, 1658.
22
For an excellent account of the controversy, see Teresa Scassa, “Nickel and
Dimed: The Dispute Over Intellectual Property Rights in the Bluenose II” (2004)
22 Dalhousie LJ 293.
23
Ibid at 319.
24
Ibid (“[p]hotographs regularly incorporate objects and items that are built from
two-dimensional design plans, as do sketches and paintings. If the Society's
position were accepted, a photograph of children playing at a unique modular
playground might infringe the copyright in the plans for the playground; a
photograph of a person standing on someone's front lawn might infringe the
copyright in the landscape design plans for that lawn. The possible examples are
limitless” at 316).
25
Ibid at 297.
21
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may attempt to acquire intellectual property over things
in which no such rights are likely to exist. It is a kind of
intellectual property "gold rush" in which claims are
staked over territory in the public domain. This approach
poses a real threat to the public domain by effectively
turning aspects of general culture into a private party's
revenue stream. It also undermines the rights of those
who cannot resist or respond to claims because of lack of
resources. Instead they are forced to acknowledge the
dominion of the other over the asserted intellectual
property, regardless of whether the claims to intellectual
property have merit.26
Scassa's remarks highlight the significance of the disproportionate
power dynamic existing between owner and user groups. The right to
deal fairly in a work or reproduce material in the public domain is of
little use to those unable to afford the legal fees necessary to defend
those rights in a court of law. As over-claiming of copyright becomes
increasingly systematic and lawsuits are instinctively threatened for
every unauthorized use, regardless of its legality, the statutory limits
and safety-valves of copyright will be rendered ineffectual, preempted by a separate and distinct “law in action” law.27
b) Contracts and TPMs: privately defined rights regimes
The second category of overreach and abuse consists of protection
measures that are substantively valid, but exist outside the
boundaries of copyright law. Through a combination of contractual
agreement and technological access and control measures, content
holders are able to construct, almost entirely on their own terms, a
comprehensive system of legally enforceable barriers governing the
control of expressive works. In many instances, these privately
defined rights regimes completely trump copyright law.

26

Ibid at 299.
See Erkstrand, supra note 11 (The term “law in action” law is originally
attributed to Judge Richard Posner) at 566.
27
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i) Contracts
Although the protection provided by copyright law is limited in
nature, freedom of contract allows individuals to supersede those
limits, amassing rights that would not otherwise be available under
the Copyright Act.28 For example, if a consumer purchases a book
from an online retailer, a contract may forbid any sale or transfer of
the book to a third-party, effectively overriding the first sale doctrine.
While two parties are fully within their rights to negotiate an
agreement outside the purview of copyright law, this freedom
becomes undermined in situations of unequal bargaining power,
particularly when an individual is unaware of the true nature of the
agreement or has little choice but to accept onerous contractual
terms.
These concerns have become especially pertinent in recent years due
to the sudden proliferation of end user licensing agreements
(EULAs), an umbrella term for clickwrap, browserwrap, shrinkwrap
and other forms of contractual agreement characterized by a
“common lack of negotiation, as the contract is dictated by the
producer and acceptance is indicated by some act other than a written
signature.”29 With a shrinkwrap agreement, for instance, the mere act
of opening software packaging can produce a legally binding
contract. Although details of the agreement were traditionally placed
on the exterior of the box, the contractual terms are now usually
found inside the box and acceptance is indicated by the purchaser's
use of the product or failure to return the item within a certain length
of time.30 In the context of clickwrap, the digital equivalent of
shrinkwrap agreements, a user is typically required to scroll through
an agreement and click a button indicating acceptance of the terms.31
Such terms can be quite severe, touching upon a broad range of legal
rights.32 The fact that individuals often have little or no knowledge
28

See Jennifer Knight, “Copyright Misuse v. Freedom of Contract: And the
Winner is...” (2005-2006) 73 Tenn L Rev 237 at 237.
29
See Renée Zmurchyk, “Contractual Validity of End User Licence Agreements”
(2006) 11 Appeal 55 at 55.
30
Ibid at 58.
31
Ibid at 56.
32
Ibid (“[EULA] terms directly conflict with many legal rights including freedom
of speech, product liability, privacy rights, security rights and intellectual property
rights” at 60).
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regarding the substance of these agreements is only further cause for
concern.33
Due in part to the recent trend of copyright owners licensing rather
than selling digital content online, EULAs have fast become the
norm in the content industry.34 They commonly include express
prohibitions against reverse engineering, review or criticism (both of
the product and the company), the disclosure of benchmark testing
and the right to resell the product.35 They can even provide content
holders with the right to unilaterally alter terms of the contract,
regardless of whether the user is aware of the change.36 The potential
consequences of this trend for copyright law are severe. According to
Margaret Jane Radin, “the widespread regulation of intellectual
property rights by contract threatens, in principle, to undermine the
official regime of intellectual property.”37 As EULAs become more
pervasive, “democratic debates about the fine details of intellectual
property law will become irrelevant as more and more people are
'contracted' out of the official regime,”38 effectively supplanting laws
enacted by Parliament with a network of contractual obligations
defined entirely by private entities. “Balanced copyright” (for lack of
a better term) is not likely attainable in such an environment.
ii) TPMs
The current rate of technological advancement and the resulting
proliferation of digital content, technological access and control
33

See Lydia Pallas Loren, “Slaying the Leather-Winged Demons in the Night:
Reforming Copyright Owner Contracting with Clickwrap Misuse” (2004) 30 Ohio
NU L Rev 495 (highlighting the fact that few, if any, users actually read the terms
of clickwrap agreements, Alchemy Mindworks presents users with the following
contractual disclaimer: “a leather-winged demon of the night will tear itself,
shrieking blood and fury, from the endless caverns of the nether world, hurl itself
into the darkness with a thirst for blood on its slavering fangs and search the very
threads of time for the throbbing of your heartbeat. Just thought you'd want to
know that”) at 497.
34
See Ian R Kerr, Alana Maurushat and Christian S Tacit, “Technical Protection
Measures: Tilting at Copyright's Windmill” (2002-2003) 34 Ottawa L Rev 7 at 4445.
35
See Loren, supra note 33 at 497.
36
See Zmurchyk, supra note 29 at 61.
37
Margaret Jane Radin, “Regime Change in Intellectual Property: Superseding the
Law of the State with the "Law" of the Firm” (2003-2004) 1 UOLTJ 173 at 178.
38
Ibid.
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measures—along with the potential support of additional legal
protections in the future—constitute perhaps the greatest challenge to
copyright law in Canada. Technological protection measures
(TPMs), sometimes referred to as “digital locks,” are mechanisms
that protect access to, or control particular uses of, digital content.
Common examples of TPMs include passwords and cryptography
technologies.39 Similar to the flexibility provided by contract law,
TPMs allow content holders to manoeuvre around the limits of
copyright protection, placing virtual fences around content in the
public domain and limiting functionality so as to prevent fair dealing
in a work. While TPMs strengthen the hand of content holders, the
protection they provide is nonetheless imperfect, as users of digital
content are still free to remove digital locks if they possess the
technical capabilities and know-how. This has led to a push from
powerful private actors and certain governments on the international
stage, primarily the United States,40 to place legal prohibitions on the
circumvention of such technology.
The United States already has an anti-circumvention regime in the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act. Although no such system exists in
Canada, four attempts have been made to introduce legal protection
for TPMs in the past seven years as part of a larger initiative for
copyright reform. Bill C-60,41 C-6142 and C-3243 all died on the order
paper, while Bill C-1144 is currently before Parliament. The issue of
anti-circumvention laws has proved highly controversial, both in the
United States and Canada. The primary concern of critics is the
enormous discrepancy between the rights provided to owners under
39

See Kerr, Maurushat and Tacit, supra note 34 at 13.
In many cases, these forces are one and the same. According to Drahos and
Braithwaite, the intellectual property agenda of the United States on the
international stage is essentially driven by a small group of powerful corporations
through ever expanding spheres of influence, a phenomenon they call “private
networked governance.” See Peter Drahos and John Braithwaite, “Hegemony
Based on Knowledge: The Role of Intellectual Property” (2004) 21 Law In
Context 204 at 206.
41
Bill C-60, An Act to amend the Copyright Act, 1st Sess, 38th Parl, 2005 (first
reading: 20 June 2005).
42
Bill C-61, An Act to amend the Copyright Act, 2nd Sess, 39th Parl, 2008 (first
reading: 12 June 2008).
43
Bill C-32, An Act to amend the Copyright Act, 3rd Sess, 40th Parl, 2010 (second
reading: 5 November 2010).
44
Bill C-11, An Act to amend the Copyright Act, 1st Sess, 41st Parl, 2011 (second
reading: 13 February 2012).
40
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copyright law and the far more expansive rights available under anticircumvention regimes. Carys Craig identifies the crux of the matter:
TPMs do not—and generally cannot—distinguish
between lawful and unlawful uses and users. There is no
necessary (and, typically, no practical) correlation
between the limits imposed on would-be users by TPMs
and the rights granted to copyright owners under the
law.45
Because rights under anti-circumvention regimes are defined by a
technological system, not by the nature of the content protected by
that system, nearly anything can be subject to legal protection, no
matter how foreign to copyright law. For this reason, anticircumvention laws have been referred to as “paracopyright,”46 an
entirely new system of rights that extends far beyond copyright law,
subject to none of its statutory limits or safety-valves. Digital locks
do not differentiate between works in the public domain and works
subject to copyright, nor do they recognize dealings with works that
are fair or even forms of expression ineligible for copyright
protection. In almost every instance, the same legal rights and
remedies are applied with equal force.47
c) Providing copyright with room to breathe
According to Carys Craig, exceptions such as fair dealing provide
the necessary “breathing space” for a properly functioning copyright
system.48 However, as copyfraud, contracts and technological
protection measures are employed with greater frequency to restrict
these safety valves and amass rights not available under the
Copyright Act, the balance inherent in copyright, as well as the
relevancy of the entire copyright regime, is effectively being choked
45

Carys Craig, “Locking Out Lawful Users: Fair Dealing and AntiCircumvention” in Michael Geist, ed, From “Radical Extremism” to “Balanced
Copyright” (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2010) 177 at 192.
46
See Dan L Burk, “Anti-circumvention Misuse” 50 UCLA L Rev 1095 at 1109.
47
Bill C-32 did contain specific exceptions to circumvention liability, but they are
narrowly defined and of little practical value to the average copyright user. This
criticism applies equally to the American DMCA system. See Craig, supra note 45
at 194.
48
Ibid at 177.
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out of existence. If this outcome is to be avoided (or at least
forestalled), an effective deterrent to overreach and abuse is urgently
needed. One potential answer is the American doctrine of copyright
misuse. Although certainly no panacea, the defence has been
successfully raised by copyright users in the United States in the
context of abusive contracts, often in relation to software licensing
agreements, making it well-adapted to the challenges of an
increasingly digital and technologically dependant world. As a
judicial doctrine based in equity, it also has the flexibility to expand
into novel areas, preventing other problematic behaviour such as
copyfraud. It may even be capable of addressing concerns relating to
TPMs and anti-circumvention laws, possibly through the
development of a separate but related doctrine of anti-circumvention
misuse.
Part II: Copyright Misuse in the United States
a) From patents to copyrights
Copyright misuse is a defence in American common law to copyright
infringement. Based upon the equitable doctrine of “unclean hands,”
the principle behind copyright misuse states that a copyright owner
should be barred from enforcing their monopoly rights in an
expressive work if they are found to have “misused” their statutory
grant of rights. Two approaches to characterizing misuse have
emerged: 1) an “anti-trust approach,” which limits misuse to
behaviour that is anti-competitive in nature, and 2) a “public policy
approach,” which applies more broadly to activity perceived as
contrary to the underlying public policy of copyright.49
Copyright misuse originally grew out of the older, more firmly
entrenched doctrine of patent misuse. In Motion Picture Patents v.
Universal Film Manufacturing. Co.,50 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled
against the validity of a licensing agreement for the use of a patented
movie projector which required that the licensee also purchase
unpatented film to be used with the equipment. “It is an attempt,
without statutory warrant, to continue the patent monopoly in this
49

See Brett Frischmann and Dan Moylan, “Evolving Common Law Doctrine of
Copyright Misuse: A Unified Theory and Its Application to Software” (2000) 15
Berk Tech LJ 865 at 867.
50
243 US 502, 37 S Ct 416 (1917).
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particular character of the film after it has expired,” stated the court,
and “to enforce it would be to create a monopoly in the manufacture
and use of moving picture films, wholly outside of the patent...”51
Motion Picture Patents effectively laid the groundwork for future
interventions by the court on the grounds of equity when an
intellectual property owner transgressed the bounds of their limited
monopoly rights. It was not until the landmark Supreme Court case
of Morton Salt v. Suppiger,52 however, that the defence of patent
misuse became fully entrenched in U.S. common law, opening the
door for the future growth of an equivalent doctrine of misuse for
copyright.
Like many cases in the misuse jurisprudence, the behaviour by the
plaintiff in Morton Salt v. Suppiger raised competition concerns.
Suppiger, the manufacturer of a patented salt-depositing machine,
licensed his product on the condition that the licensee only purchase
his unpatented salt tablets for use with the device. When Morton
began to manufacture and sell a similar salt-depositing machine,
Suppiger brought an action for infringement. Upholding the decision
of the trial judge, the Court rejected his claim, ruling that the use of a
patent to control the market of a non-patented product constituted
patent misuse. The grant of a limited-term patent monopoly was a
“special privilege,” reasoned the court, provided by the state for the
purpose of advancing specific public policy goals, namely the
promotion of “the Progress of Science and useful Arts” set out in the
U.S. Constitution.53 Suppiger's attempt to claim rights above and
beyond his grant was contrary to such goals and therefore a violation
of that privilege. Although issues of competition were at the heart of
the public policy concerns in Morton, the court made clear that its
ruling was based purely in equity, not anti-trust law, declining to
engage traditional anti-trust analysis under the Clayton Act.54
In making their decision, the Supreme Court acknowledged in dicta
the existence of a related doctrine of copyright misuse. The Court
cited two cases, Edward Thompson Co. v. Am. Law Book Co.55 and

51

Ibid at 518.
314 US 488, 62 S Ct 402 (1942) [Morton].
53
Ibid at 492.
54
Ibid at 494.
55
122 F 922 (2d Cir 1903).
52
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Stone & McCarrick, Inc. v. Dugan Piano Co.,56 “for the application
of the like doctrine in the case of copyright.”57 Given that the
copyright misuse cases referred to by the court were similarly
decided on the basis of equity, not anti-trust law, commentators have
cited this fact as justification for developing a broad approach to
copyright misuse unrestricted by anti-trust analysis.58 However, due
to the passage of legislation, patent misuse now closely resembles an
anti-trust-based defence59 and the correct approach to copyright
misuse remains in question.
b) Lasercomb v. Reynolds: copyright misuse is born
The doctrine of copyright misuse laid mostly dormant until
Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds,60 the first case to fully develop
and uphold the defence in a federal court of appeals.61 Lasercomb
America, a manufacturer of steel rule dies used to cut and score
cardboard, developed software called Interact to guide the process.
This software was licensed to other cardboard manufacturing
companies, including Lasercomb's competitor Holiday Steel, under
strict terms of non-competition. Job Reynolds, a computer
programmer for Holiday Steel, circumvented the software's
protective measures and produced unauthorized copies of the
program under the direction of the company's president Larry
Holliday. Holiday Steel then began selling its own software, which
was almost an exact copy of Interact. Lasercomb sued Holiday Steel,
naming Holliday and Reynolds as co-defendants. The District Court
granted an injunction against Holliday and awarded Lasercomb
damages on the basis of copyright infringement, breach of contract
and fraud.
On appeal to the Fourth Circuit, Holliday and Reynolds raised the
defence of copyright misuse, attacking the software licensing
agreement between the two companies as unduly restrictive. The
licence sold by Lasercomb precluded Holliday from developing rival
software in any manner for a period of 99 years. After affirming the
56

220 F 837 (5th Cir 1915).
Morton, supra note 52 at 494.
58
See Frischmann and Moylan, supra note 49 at 883.
59
See 35 USC § 271(d) (1994).
60
911 F2d 970 (4th Cir 1990) [Lasercomb].
61
See Frischmann and Moylan, supra note 49 at 888.
57
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availability of copyright misuse as a defence, the court agreed that
the licensing agreement was problematic. The non-compete language
suppressed “any attempt by the licensee to independently implement
the idea which Interact expresses,”62 effectively undermining the
idea/expression dichotomy. In addition, the company was required to
“forego utilization of the creative abilities of all its officers, directors
and employees in the area of CAD/CAM die-making software,”63
with the consequence that society as a whole, not just the company,
would be deprived of their creative output. Finally, the duration of
the agreement “could be longer than the copyright itself.”64 By
reaching beyond the scope of the statutory grant, Lasercomb was
“attempting to use its copyright in a manner adverse to the public
policy embodied in copyright law.”65 The Court therefore concluded
that the licence constituted a misuse of copyright and set aside the
damages for copyright infringement.
Although the Fourth Circuit acknowledged the relatively scant
precedent supporting the defence, the Court reasoned that copyright
misuse was a logical extension of patent misuse given the shared
public policies underlying the two forms of intellectual property.
Tracing the historical origins of patent and copyright law in England,
as well as their entrenchment in the U.S. Constitution and subsequent
statutory and judicial developments, the Court observed:
Both patent law and copyright law seek to increase the
store of human knowledge and arts by rewarding
inventors and authors with the exclusive rights to their
works for a limited time. At the same time, the granted
monopoly power does not extend to property not
covered by the patent or copyright.66
Given the existence of these common ends, the court found ample
justification “for the application of the misuse defense to copyright
as well as patent law.”67
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In upholding the defence, the court was careful to clearly separate the
misuse analysis from anti-trust law. Referring to the Supreme Court
decision in Morton Salt as an authority, “the question is not whether
the copyright is being used in a manner violative [sic] of antitrust law
(such as whether the licensing agreement is ‘reasonable’), but
whether the copyright is being used in a manner violative [sic] of the
public policy embodied in the grant of a copyright.”68
c) Copyright misuse jurisprudence post-Lasercomb
Following the germinal decision in Lasercomb, courts have been
unable to agree upon a single, coherent doctrinal approach to
copyright misuse. Although a number of relatively minor issues
persist, the most fundamental area of disagreement concerns the role
played by anti-trust law in the analysis. At one end of the spectrum
are cases that reject the public policy approach adopted in Lasercomb
outright, instead employing a two-step “rule of reason” test modelled
on anti-trust law, which requires a defendant to show actual anticompetitive effects.69 Guided by Judge Posner's reasoning in
Saturday Evening Post Co. v. Rumbleseat Press, Inc.,70 sceptics of
the public policy approach argue that anti-trust law offers more
certain principles to ground a misuse analysis. It should be noted,
however, that Judge Posner seems to have reversed his previous
position in light of the growing trend of abusive behaviour among
copyright owners,71 while other commentators have criticized the
68
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anti-trust approach as confusing the purposes of copyright and antitrust law.72
At the other end of the spectrum are cases fully removed from the
anti-competition context, potentially extending the misuse doctrine to
cover restrictions preventing the dissemination of critical language
and information,73 as well as procedural abuses, such as making
hollow threats of litigation in order to bully parties into settlement.74
There is a certain degree of overlap between nearly all approaches,
however, with many applications of the doctrine sharing common
analytical elements (asking, for instance, whether a restraint falls
within the scope of the grant). An exploration of the merits of the
two contrasting approaches is beyond the scope of this paper, but the
topic has been dealt with at length elsewhere.75
One area in which copyright misuse is yet to be recognized is in the
context of anti-circumvention technology.76 Due to this limit on the
doctrine's scope, fears have been raised that copyright owners are
now incentivized to actively misuse paracopyright in a manner
contrary to the public interest.77 Such concerns seem to be wellplaced. In the relatively short time since the DMCA was passed in
the United States, anti-circumvention rights have already been
applied in a manner that largely mirrors the abuses of copyright
owners in copyright misuse cases.78 Commentators such as Dan Burk
have responded by stressing the need to develop a separate but
related doctrine of anti-circumvention misuse, noting that much of
use an infringement suit to obtain property protection, here in data, that copyright
law clearly does not confer, hoping to force a settlement or even achieve an
outright victory over an opponent that may lack the resources or the legal
sophistication to resist effectively, is an abuse of process.”)
72
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the groundwork has already been laid: “the precedent for elaborating
such an anti-circumvention misuse claim lies in the recent
development of copyright misuse imported from the patent context.
Misuse may again be transplanted out of its previous milieu and into
the realm of anti-circumvention.”79 Others have suggested that the
existing doctrine of copyright misuse is adequately flexible to
address certain anti-circumvention misuses.80 However, American
courts have yet to move in either direction.
Despite the fact that copyright misuse remains doctrinally uncertain
and has yet to be expressly adopted by the United States Supreme
Court, scholars generally agree that the doctrine's acceptance is
growing.81 Similar observations have been made by other courts
encountering the defence.82 This can partly be attributed to the
increasing ubiquity of technology in society and a resulting reliance
on licensing agreements to govern rights to copyrighted works in the
digital environment, an area in which copyright misuse is particularly
well-suited and most frequently raised.83 Regardless of the doctrine's
ultimate destination in American jurisprudence, however, its judicial
origins and underlying basis in equity render it sufficiently adaptable
to a host of new legal challenges.84 As a result, any attempt to import
copyright misuse into Canada should not fixate unduly on the
specific applications of the doctrine in the American context; the
primary issue for consideration is whether copyright misuse,
generally conceived, can be justified in principle in Canadian law.
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Part III: Copyright Misuse in Canada
a) An unaddressed issue
In comparison to the United States, Canadian jurisprudence and
academic literature on the subject of copyright misuse is scant and
underdeveloped. While some scholars have noted in brief the need to
import such a doctrine into Canadian law, none have seriously
attempted to do so. Sunny Handa is possibly the first academic to
raise the idea, proposing copyright misuse as a means of protecting
the ability of users to engage in reverse engineering of computer
software.85 Noting that the doctrine's basis in equity makes the
defence potentially available to Canadian litigants, Handa further
suggests that the existence of copyright misuse has already been
implicitly acknowledged by the Supreme Court of Canada in Massie
& Renwick Ltd. v. Underwriters' Survey Bureau Ltd.86 In contrast,
Handa also notes that the Federal Court of Appeal has expressed
doubts that anti-competitive behaviour can provide a defence against
copyright infringement.87 However, both cases are quite old,
approximately 70 and 30 years respectively, so they seem hardly
applicable in the modern technological era, particularly given the
context of software licensing agreements in which copyright misuse
first arose.
More recently, Canadian academics have turned their attention to
copyright misuse in response to controversy surrounding TPMs and
various attempts to amend the Copyright Act to provide legal
protection against the circumvention of such measures. Concerned
about the potential chilling effect paracopyright might have on
competition, creativity and the dissemination of knowledge and
information, Alex Cameron and Robert Tomkowicz propose either
incorporating copyright misuse into Canadian law or amending the
Copyright Act to incorporate the doctrine's principles, arguing that
such a move “could help further both copyright and competition
policy goals.”88 Sharing many of the same concerns, Michael Geist
85
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also offers copyright misuse as a possible counterweight to anticircumvention measures, warning that “without a legal principle to
mitigate against abuse, Canada would be open to the prospect for
even greater abuse of anti-circumvention provisions than that found
in the United States.”89 Finally, Michal Shur-Ofry explores copyright
misuse, or a slightly altered form of the doctrine, as a means of
furthering his somewhat radical proposal to limit the scope of
copyright protection based on the popularity of a work.90 However,
like most scholars touching on the subject, Shur-Ofry mentions the
doctrine in brief and makes no attempt to justify the defence in the
Canadian context.
While few scholars have attempted to provide a sound basis for
recognizing copyright misuse in Canada, fewer still have advanced
arguments against its viability. Among those who have, two issues
have been raised. First, it has been argued that the Canadian
Copyright Act lacks a clear and explicit statement of purpose.
Without a statutory or constitutional provision similar to that of the
U.S. Progress Clause, Canada does not have a firmly articulated
policy basis in which to employ the copyright misuse defence.91
Second, doubts have been raised following the recent decision of
Euro-Excellence Inc. v. Kraft Can. Inc.,92 the first Supreme Court of
Canada case to expressly mention the term “copyright misuse.”
Although the doctrine was only referenced in dicta and had no
bearing on the outcome of the dispute, the Court's reception to the
idea has nonetheless been viewed as unfavourable.93 However,
neither of these concerns provides a sufficient basis to discount a
viable “made-in-Canada” approach to copyright misuse.
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b) Importing the doctrine into Canadian law
As we have seen, certain U.S. courts have consistently stressed the
public policy behind copyright—a limited grant of monopoly rights
aimed at spurring the creation and dissemination of knowledge and
information—as justification for the misuse defence. From this
perspective, overprotection is just as dangerous as underprotection,
and courts therefore have a duty to intervene when owners of
intellectual property attempt to claim rights beyond the scope of their
grant. So fundamental is this understanding of copyright in the
American context that it is expressly entrenched in article 1, section
8, clause 8 of the United States Constitution, a provision commonly
referred to as the “Progress Clause”:
[The Congress shall have power] To promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writing and Discoveries.94
The Canadian Copyright Act contains no explicit statement of
purpose comparable to that of the Progress Clause and Canadian
constitutional documents are equally silent on the matter. However, a
clear public policy underlying copyright in Canada does nonetheless
exist. It is derived from two sources: first, an inherited British system
of copyright law, including a history and tradition that similarly
shaped developments in the American context; and second, a recent
trilogy of cases decided by the Supreme Court of Canada, which
articulated for the first time a distinctly Canadian understanding of
copyright law and its purpose in society. Taken together, these
sources provide a strong justification for the application of copyright
misuse in Canada.
i) The British tradition
When looking to evidence of copyright's purpose in the United
States, a common starting point is the Progress Clause in the United
States Constitution, with further discussion usually then leading to
the recognition of the influence played by early British developments
in the area of copyright law. In Lasercomb, the foundational case for
94
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copyright misuse in the United States, the court took the reverse
approach, beginning with the emergence of “letters” patent in
sixteenth century England and the subsequent adoption in 1710 of
the Statute of Anne.95 Commonly acknowledged as the world's first
modern copyright legislation, the Statute of Anne contained an overt
statement of purpose within its formal title: An Act for the
Encouragement of Learning, by vesting the Copies of printed Books
in the Authors or Purchasers of such Copies, during the Times
therein mentioned.96
The statute stood as a utilitarian bargain.97 Authors were offered a
limited-term monopoly in the reproduction of their published works
as an incentive to create, fostering greater innovation and creativity
in society. After the term expired, works would enter into the public
domain and others would be free to copy and build upon the concepts
and expressions contained within. In this regard, the rights granted
under the statute were clearly instrumentalist in nature, aimed at
promoting the public interest in the creation and dissemination of
knowledge. This understanding of copyright has had a lasting effect
not only in Britain, but also in the United States and Canada.
As the court in Lasercomb observed, the framers of the United States
Constitution continued the British tradition with the enactment of the
Progress Clause, a statement of copyright's purpose closely aligned
with the Statute of Anne.98 The first Act governing copyright in the
United States, entitled An Act for the Encouragement of Learning by
securing the copies of Maps, Charts and Books to the authors and
proprietors of such copies, during the times therein mentioned,99
reflects the same British influence,100 as did early copyright
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legislation adopted at the state level.101 Although the United States
now represents the world's most prominent voice regarding issues of
intellectual property, pushing its own distinct brand of copyright law
and theory, its British roots remain without question.102
Compared to the United States, Canada is even more beholden to the
British system of copyright law.103 In fact, it was not until the passage
of the 1911 Copyright Act104 in Britain that Canada and other British
Dominions were granted the authority to repeal all existing Imperial
copyright laws currently in force at the time.105 When Canada finally
enacted its first modern copyright statute a decade later in 1921,106 it
was essentially a copy of Britain's 1911 Act and many elements of
the British-influenced legislation remain in place today.107 Given that
Canada and the United States share the same legislative and judicial
heritage in the area of copyright, and the influence of early English
developments in intellectual property law has been cited as
justification for copyright misuse in the United States, it logically
follows that the misuse doctrine cannot be wholly alien to the
Canadian understanding of copyright. At the very least, solid ground
exists for further exploration of the doctrine's legitimacy in Canada.
ii) The copyright “trilogy”
Despite the strong historical connection to the British tradition of
copyright law in Canada, or perhaps even because of it, a clear
articulation of a distinctly Canadian understanding of copyright law
101
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failed to emerge until only recently.108 According to Daniel Gervais,
it was not until the copyright “trilogy”—three landmark cases
beginning with Théberge v. Galerie d'Art du Petit Champlain109 in
2002 and later followed by CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of
Upper Canada110 and SOCAIN v. CAIP111 two years after—that the
Supreme Court of Canada stepped in to fill the purposive vacuum.
The principles laid down in these three cases provide a clear
justificatory basis for copyright misuse in Canada.
In Théberge, the first case in the trilogy, the Court had to determine
whether a process of transferring ink from a poster onto a canvas
backing constituted “reproduction” as understood under the
Copyright Act. Writing for the majority, Justice Binnie took the
opportunity to fully articulate for the first time the purpose of
copyright law in Canada, defining it as: “a balance between
promoting the public interest in the encouragement and
dissemination of works of the arts and intellect and obtaining a just
reward for the creator...”112 A number of important principles have
emerged from this seemingly simple statement of purpose, several of
which are particularly relevant in the context of copyright misuse.
First, the concept of “balance” between dual objectives, one of which
is the public interest, indicates that copyright law in Canada cannot
be viewed entirely through the eyes of the rights-holder; there are
other legitimate interests at stake. Second, it logically follows from
this concept of balance that the rights of owners must necessarily be
limited in nature. If at any time these limits are surpassed, the proper
balance will be undermined and the public interest threatened. The
Court cautioned against “excessive control by holders of copyrights”
for this reason, warning that it may “unduly limit the ability of the
public domain to incorporate and embellish creative innovation in
the long-term interests of society as a whole, or create practical
obstacles to proper utilization.”113 Third, the Court spoke of copyright
in decidedly economic terms. Employing the rationale of incentives,
they reasoned that it would be “as inefficient to overcompensate
108
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artists and authors for the right of reproduction as it would be selfdefeating to undercompensate them.”114 It would appear that, from an
economic perspective, the rights and rewards of copyright owners are
not an end in themselves. Commentators have interpreted such
statements as constituting a marked shift to a more instrumentalist
view of copyright, one focused on ensuring “the orderly production
and distribution of, and access to, works of art and intellect.”115
Théberge was decided by a narrow 4-3 majority, with two justices
absent from the decision. If there were any lingering doubts
regarding the precedential authority of the case, however, they were
thoroughly put to rest two years later in CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law
Society of Upper Canada. At issue was whether the Law Society's
Great Library was liable for copyright infringement for photocopying
and distributing legal materials published by CCH Canadian. Writing
for a unanimous Supreme Court, Chief Justice McLachlin affirmed
the dual objectives articulated by Justice Binnie in Théberge,
adopting the concept of “balance” as a guide for establishing a
definition of originality under the Act:
When courts adopt a standard of originality requiring
only that something be more than a mere copy or that
someone simply show industriousness to ground
copyright in a work, they tip the scale in favour of the
author's or creator's rights, at the loss of society's interest
in maintaining a robust public domain that could help
foster future creative innovation.116
Echoing the language employed in Théberge, McLachlin C.J.
stressed the dangers of overprotection, warning against the
impoverishment of the public domain and the likely consequences of
intellectual and creative stagnation. In the interest of society and
follow-on creators, she underscored the need to “safeguard against
the author being overcompensated for his or her work.”117
The Court in CCH also took the significant step of granting further
weight and legitimacy to the interests of users of copyrighted works.
114
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In the process of defining the scope of fair dealing, the Court
characterized the statutory exception to copyright infringement as a
positive right, not simply a defence, held by copyright users: “The
fair dealing exception, like other exceptions in the Copyright Act, is a
user's right. In order to maintain the proper balance between the
rights of a copyright owner and users' interests, it must not be
interpreted restrictively.”118 The concept of users' rights extends
beyond fair dealing to include all exceptions under the Copyright
Act. This means that the interests of copyright-holders must not only
be balanced against the public interest generally, but also against the
individual rights of each copyright user.
In the last case of the trilogy, SOCAN, the Court was tasked with
determining the potential liability of Internet service providers (ISPs)
for the transmission of copyright protected content across their
networks. Although the decision primarily turned on matters of
statutory interpretation, the Court nonetheless began their analysis by
acknowledging the principle of balance established in Théberge, as
well as the unique interests engaged by the technology-specific
context of the appeal, noting:
The capacity of the Internet to disseminate “works of the
arts and intellect” is one of the great innovations of the
information age. Its use should be facilitated rather than
discouraged, but this should not be done unfairly at the
expense of those who created the works of arts and
intellect in the first place.119
The Court ultimately found that ISPs, acting as mere conduits of
information, have not “authorized” or “communicated” content as
defined under the Act and should therefore be exempt from liability.
In the view of Daniel Gervais, the decision in SOCAN shows clear
evidence of economic and instrumentalist reasoning. Given that the
Internet is a public good and ISPs are its guardian, “it would be
economically inefficient to impose a liability on them to merely
transmit content they do not control,” writes Gervais. “[I]f liability
exists for content being transmitted on the Internet, ISPs are not a
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proper target for rightsholders.”120 If economic considerations are
becoming increasingly central to the Court’s interpretation of
copyright, then the inefficiencies of overcompensating creators
warned of in Théberge should hold further weight, underscoring the
need to prevent copyright owners from extending their control of
expressive works beyond the scope of their statutory grant of rights.
Together, the trilogy of cases stands for the proposition that
copyright protection should be limited in nature. Rather than being
an end unto itself, copyright serves a clear purpose, one that can be
undermined by too much protection. This understanding goes to the
core of copyright misuse and is roughly analogous to the reasoning
employed by U.S. courts enforcing the doctrine. In fact, some aspects
of the Canadian context arguably provide greater support for the
misuse defence than in the United States. Not only has the Supreme
Court of Canada stressed the limited nature of copyright through the
concept of balance, warning against the negative repercussions of
excessive protection, but the language of “user's rights” goes beyond
that of American copyright jurisprudence. Not only is the public
interest threatened when copyright owners claim rights outside the
scope of the grant, but the rights of users, which must not be
subjugated to the rights of copyright owners, are also trampled as a
result. Add in the economic and utilitarian calculations that
increasingly drive judicial decision-making on matters of copyright
and it becomes difficult to understand how instances of overreach
and abuse can be allowed to continue unchecked. If a sufficient
justificatory basis for copyright misuse in Canada did not exist prior
to 2002, then it must surely exist now.
iii) “Best left for another day”
Soon after the copyright trilogy was decided, Euro-Excellence Inc. v.
Kraft Can. Inc. arrived on the Supreme Court docket. As the first
case to expressly mention the doctrine of copyright misuse, albeit
only in passing, some commentators have argued that EuroExcellence potentially stands as a complete rejection of the defence
in Canada.121 However, such a conclusion represents a misreading of
the decision and is unwarranted on a number of grounds.
120
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The dispute in Euro-Excellence concerned the parallel importation of
goods. Kraft, the owner of Côte d'Or and Toblerone chocolate bars,
attempted to stop Euro-Excellence from purchasing the chocolate
bars in Europe and importing them into Canada by alleging
secondary infringement of the copyrighted logos on the packaging.
The Court rejected the claim, ruling that Euro-Excellence could not
be held secondarily liable because no primary infringement had
occurred. In the course of the proceedings, Euro-Excellence asserted
a defence of copyright misuse.
The only opinion to expressly acknowledge the attempted defence,
written by Justice Bastarache and supported by Justices LeBel and
Charron, declined to rule on the doctrine's validity given the
plaintiff's failure to make out their case. The Court's finding that no
infringement of Kraft's copyright actually occurred rendered “an
appeal to this developing doctrine unnecessary” and, as result, the
possible application of copyright misuse in Canada was “best left for
another day.”122
Although Bastarache J. deferred the question of copyright misuse,
his opinion nonetheless turned on logic surprisingly similar to that of
the misuse doctrine. He argued that copyright owners should not be
able to assert copyright protection in a work in the context of
secondary infringement when the copyright is being used in a
manner “incidental” to a product being sold.123 As a result, Kraft
cannot use the copyrighted logo appearing on their packaging as a
means of protecting market share or goodwill in consumer goods, a
domain traditionally reserved for trademark law. In support of this
principle, Bastarache J. cited the case of Kirkbi v. Ritvik Holdings,124
which held that trademarks cannot be leveraged to protect subject
matter that normally falls within the domain of patent:
Trade-mark law protects market share in commercial
goods; copyright protects the economic gains resulting
from an exercise of skill and judgment. If trade-mark law
does not protect market share in a particular situation,
122
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the law of copyright should not be used to provide that
protection, if that requires contorting copyright outside
its normal sphere of operation. The protection offered by
copyright cannot be leveraged to include protection of
economic interests that are only tangentially related to
the copyrighted work [emphasis added].125
Despite Bastarache J.'s stated intent not to answer the copyright
misuse question, this passage seems strangely reminiscent of the
misuse defence. Justice Bastarache even grounded his reasoning in
the purpose of the Copyright Act, the principles of which he derived
from the copyright trilogy mentioned earlier, and the concept of
“balance” in copyright.126
The opinion of Justice Rothstein, supported by Justices Binnie,
Deschamps and the concurring opinion of Justice Fish, strongly
disagreed with the parallel drawn between the Kirkbi decision and
the case before them:
The difficulty in attempting to analogize this case and
Kirkbi is that the Court in Kirkbi relied on a provision of
the Trade-marks Act in order to find that there could be
no overlap between trade-mark and patent. In contrast, s.
64(3)(b) of the Copyright Act permits a single work to be
the subject of both copyright and trade-mark protection.
In other words, Parliament has authorized an overlap
between copyright and trade-mark.127
Although commentators have suggested otherwise,128 this reasoning
does not conflict with the logic underlying copyright misuse. In most
instances, the defence only applies when a copyright holder has
attempted to extend their copyright beyond the scope of the grant.
However, in the case of Euro-Excellence, Justice Rothstein found
that Parliament clearly intended to authorize concurrent copyright
and trade-mark protection, meaning that the use in question fell well
within the legitimate scope of the grant. It is impossible to “misuse”
125

Euro-Excellence, supra note 92 at para 83.
Ibid at para 84.
127
Ibid at para 13.
128
See Cross and Yu, supra note 3 (arguing that Justice Rothstein's opinion
explicitly rejects the possibility of copyright misuse in Canada at 459).
126

!

Vol. 21

Dalhousie Journal of Legal Studies

60

a copyright for a purpose that, according to Justice Rothstein, is
endorsed by Parliament. Given that copyright misuse has no
theoretical application in such instances, the Court had no justifiable
reason to expound upon the potential application of a novel judicial
doctrine. Thus, not only was Euro-Excellence not liable for
secondary infringement, making the consideration of valid defences
unnecessary, but Rothstein's interpretation of the Copyright Act
rendered the issue of copyright misuse moot.
Further muddying the issue, Justice Fish agreed with the opinion of
Justice Rothstein, but expressed “grave doubt” as to “whether the
law governing the protection of intellectual property rights in Canada
can be transformed in this way into an instrument of trade control not
contemplated by the Copyright Act.”129 With two groups of justices
reaching their concurring decisions through widely divergent paths,
Justice Fish expressing concern over a relatively key matter, and
McLachlin C.J. and Abella J. standing in dissent, it is difficult to
extrapolate any clear principles regarding an issue so peripheral to
the case. While none of the scattered opinions constitute anything
close to an embrace of the copyright misuse doctrine, it is equally
inaccurate to conclude that the defence has been soundly rejected. In
fact, the Court's reasoning seems largely harmonious with copyright
misuse in many aspects. At most, Euro-Excellence indicates a
preference on behalf of the Court to refrain from needlessly
exploring a novel doctrine's application in Canada unless clearly
warranted in the circumstances.
Part IV: Conclusion
According to one commentator, “[copyright] misuse has now
reached a stage of development similar to the stage that the fair use
defense reached before its statutory enactment.”130 As a result,
American scholars have recently proposed codifying the defence in
an amendment to the U.S. Copyright Act.131 Other countries are
considering similar changes. Currently in the process of copyright
reform, Brazil is evaluating a proposed provision with a purpose
comparable to that of anti-circumvention misuse. Rather than
129
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temporarily barring actions for infringement, however, behaviour
constituting misuse would lead to actual civil sanctions.132
While statutory reform may offer a more effective, long-term
solution, the threats posed by overreaching copyright owners are
urgent and a judicial doctrine of copyright misuse represents a more
immediate and flexible approach. Given the clear articulation of
copyright's purpose to have recently emerged from the Supreme
Court of Canada, a strong justificatory basis now exists for the
doctrine's importation into Canadian law. Although the exact
doctrinal scope and function of copyright misuse remain uncertain,
the need to create a disincentive for overreach and abuse is clear. The
questionable procedural behaviour of overzealous copyright owners,
coupled with the increasing use of licensing agreements and
technological protection measures to control access to expressive
works, threaten to not only render the statutory limits and safetyvalves of copyright ineffectual, but also to supplant copyright as the
dominant means of exercising control over expressive works.
Copyright misuse should be considered as one tool among many
necessary to avoid such consequences.
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